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Commentary
By Stephen E. Kalish*
David Hoffman's Essay on
Professional Deportment and the
Current Legal Ethics Debate
I. INTRODUCTION
A. The Role
Professional codes of ethics define the role of the individual
professional in society. They describe the balance that must be
struck between any number of conflicting duties or trusts. In the
case of an attorney, the professional code will balance the duties to
clients, to himself, to other attorneys and judges, to the public gen-
erally, to truth, and to justice.
If the balance is struck so that the attorney owes a preeminent
duty to advance client interests, then the attorney's role will be
frequently characterized as that of an advocate. On the other
hand, if the attorney's first duty is to truth and to justice, he will be
labeled an officer of the court.
In 1969, the American Bar Association adopted the Model Code
of Professional Responsibility (ABA Code). It defines the attor-
ney's role as primarily that of an advocate in an adversarial setting.
Canons 7 and 4 are its essential provisions. They provide that an
attorney should represent a client zealously within the bounds of
the law and generally preserve the client's secrets and confi-
dences. There are, of course, some limits on this zealous advo-
cacy,' but in balance the tone is adversarial. For example, the
ABA Code mandates that: (1) an attorney not reveal known facts
adverse to his client's interest unless required to do so by law or
rule,2 (2) an attorney not reveal a client's perjury if the attorney
* Professor of Law, University of Nebraska. Research for this Commentary
was made available by a Lane Foundation Summer Research Grant.
1. See, e.g., ABA MODEL CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY, DR 7-102 (1981)
[hereinafter cited as ABA CODE].
2. Id. DR 7-101(A) (1), DR 7-102(A) (3).
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learned of the lie via a privileged communication,3 and (3) an attor-
ney use all means (with some minor exceptions) that might ad-
vance the goals of his client.4 Even the attorney's right to resign
when asked to pursue a legally permissible but unjust course of
action is severely restricted.5 Although the ABA Code hints at
other resolutions of the attorney's conflicting duties, such as a ref-
erence to the role of the attorney as an advisor,6 and the very lim-
ited reference to the attorney as arbitrator or mediator,7 these
concepts remain undeveloped.
In 1977, the ABA established a Commission on Evaluation of
Professional Standards (the "Kutak commission") to evaluate the
ABA Code. In January, 1980, the Kutak commission issued a dis-
cussion draft of the Model Rules of Professional Conduct.8 The
discussion draft de-emphasizes the importance of the attorney's
duty to advance the interests of the client and to preserve client
confidences. It instead defines the attorney's role as an officer of
the court. For example, the discussion draft permits an attorney in
litigation proceedings to apprise another of known facts adverse to
his client's interest;9 it requires an attorney to correct a manifest
misapprehension of fact created by his client in negotiations;' 0 it
requires an attorney to disclose a client's perjury, regardless of
how the attorney learned of the perjury;"1 it permits an attorney to
disclose confidential information to the extent necessary to rectify
the consequences of a deliberately wrongful act;'2 and, although it
permits the client control over the means and ends of proceed-
ings,' 3 it allows the attorney to withdraw from the representation if
3. Id. DR 7-101(A) (1), DR 7-102(B) (1).
4. See id. DR 7-101(A) (1), DR 7-101(B). Ethical Consideration 7-8 of the ABA
Code provides: "[T]he decision whether to forego legally available objectives
or methods ... is ultimately for the client." Id. EC 7-8. Ethical Considera-
tion 7-7, however, allows the attorney to make decisions "not affecting the
merits of the cause or substantially prejudicing the rights of a client." Id. EC
7-7.
5. Disciplinary Rule 2-110(A)(1) prohibits withdrawal until steps to avoid
prejudice to the client have been taken. Id. DR 2-110(A) (1). Disciplinary
Rule 2-110(C) (1) (e) suggests that an attorney may not withdraw, in a matter
pending before a tribunal, merely because his client insists on action con-
trary to the advice and judgment of the attorney. Id. DR 2-110(C) (1) (e).
6. Id. EC 7-3.
7. Id. EC 5-20.
8. ABA MODEL RULEs OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT (Discussion Draft, Jan. 30,
1980) [hereinafter cited as MODEL RULEs (Discussion Draft) ].
9. Id. Rule 3.1(e).
10. Id. Rule 4.2(b)(2).
11. Id. Rule 3.1(b).
12. Id. Rule 1.7(b) (2).
13. Id. Rule 1.3(a).
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the client persists in insisting on an unjust course of action.14 The
discussion draft even attempts to address separately the implica-
tions of attorney conduct in several functional roles beyond that of
mere advocate, such as adviser, negotiator, intermediary, and
evaluator.'5
In June, 1980, the Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foun-
dation issued its response to the discussion draft of the Model
Rules. This response, the American Lawyer's Code of Conduct,16
is a vigorous attack on the discussion draft of the Model Rules.
The Introduction to the Code of Conduct states that "our system of
justice is an adversary system"' 7 and that "proponents of an alter-
native to this Code have forgotten that basic fact."18 In other
words, it charges that the discussion draft of the Model Rules is
innovative and revolutionary. The Code of Conduct defines the
attorney's role as exclusively that of an advocate. The attorney's
first and foremost obligations are to preserve the confidences of his
client19 and to advance the interests of his client.20 All other duties
are of minimal importance. The Code of Conduct follows the man-
date of Lord Brougham.2 1 In 1820 he wrote:
An advocate, by the sacred duty which he owes his client, knows, in the
discharge of that office, but one person in the world, that client and none
other. To save the client by all expedient means, to protect that client at
all hazards and costs to all others, and among others to himself, is the
highest and most unquestioned of his duties: and he must not regard the
alarm, the suffering, the torment, the destruction which he may bring on
any other. Nay, separating even the duties of a patriot from those of an
advocate, and casting them, if need be, to the wind, he must go on reckless
of the consequences, if his fate it should unhappily be to involve his coun-
try in confusion for his client's sake.22
Eleven months after the Code of Conduct was released, the
Kutak commission issued its proposed final draft of the Model
14. Rule 1.16(b) (2) provides that the attorney may withdraw if the client's cho-
sen means are "unjust," regardless of whether or not the matter is pending
before a tribunal. Id. Rule 1.16(b) (2).
15. Id. Parts 2-6.
16. TnE AMERICAN LAwYER's CODE OF CONDUCT (Public Discussion Draft, June
1980), reprinted in TRIAL, Aug. 1980, at 44. [hereinafter cited as CODE OF CoN-
DUCT]. The Roscoe Pound-American Trial Lawyers Foundation undertook
the promulgation of the CODE OF CONDUCT at the request of Theodore L Kos-
koff, President of the Association of Trial Lawyers of America. See CODE OF
CONDUCT, supra, at i.
17. Id. at I.
18. Id. at iii.
19. Id. at v-vi.
20. Id. at iii.
21. Id.
22. Rogers, The Ethics of Advocacy, 15 L.Q. REV. 259, 269 (1899) (quoting Lord
Brougham).
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Rules of Professional Conduct.23 In the Chairman's Introduction,
the Chairman recognized and responded to the Code of Conduct
criticisms. He wrote that "the rule of confidentiality had never
been absolute"24 and that properly understood "the adjudicatory
process [must be] reasonable, reliable and just."2 He claimed
that the attorney has a special responsibility for the integrity of the
adjudicatory process; in other words, the attorney is an "officer of
the court."26 In spite of these brave words, the proposed final draft
of the Model Rules is a retreat from the substantive stance of the
discussion draft of the Model Rules. For example, the proposed
final draft provides that: (1) an attorney in litigation does not have
the right to apprise another of known facts adverse to his client's
interests; 27 (2) an attorney in negotiation need only disclose a fact
adverse to his client's interest to prevent "assisting a criminal or
fraudulent act;" 28 (3) an attorney may reveal confidences to pre-
vent criminal or fraudulent acts by a client only if he "believes [it]
is likely to result in death or substantial bodily harm, or substan-
tial injury to the financial interests or property of another" 29 and
(4) an attorney called upon by a client to pursue unjust means can
only withdraw as of right if the actions are "criminal or fraudu-
lent."3 0 Finally, the proposed final draft limits the discussion
draft's effort to emphasize attorney roles other than that of
advocate. 31
B. The Rules
Ethical issues are generally perceived as matters of personal
conscience; an ethically good person seeks the proper resolution of
these issues regardless of sanction or punishment. Mandatory
23. ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFESSIONAL CoNDucT (Proposed Final Draft, May
30, 1981), reprinted'in 67 A.B.A.J. 1299 (1981) [hereinafter cited as MODEL
RULES (Proposed Final Draft) ]. The Kutak commission also prepared a com-
panion draft, commonly called the "Blue Edition," of the MODEL RULES (Pro-
posed Final Draft) organized into ABA Code format with Canons, Ethical
Considerations, and Disciplinary Rules. See ABA MODEL RULES OF PROFES-
SIONAL CONDUCT (Alternative Draft, May 30, 1981) [hereinafter cited as
MODEL RULES (Blue Edition)]. The Kutak commission did not recommend
the Blue Edition and the ABA House of Delegates has rejected it.
24. Introduction to MODEL RULES (Proposed Final Draft), supra note 23.
25. Id.
26. Id.
27. Rules 1.2(a) and 3.3 provide no duty or opportunity to disclose adverse facts.
MODEL RULES (Proposed Final Draft), supra note 23, Rules 1.2(a), 3.3.
28. Id. Rule 4.1(b)(2).
29. Id. Rule 1.6(b) (2).
30. Id. Rule 1.16(b) (1).
31. The proposed final draft has only two functional headings, one for counselor
and one for advocate.
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rules are generally perceived as externally imposed obligations; an
obedient person follows them to avoid punishment. Twentieth
century codes of legal ethics generally incorporate both minimum
rules and aspirational goals for professional conduct. The proper
balance between these rules and goals, and the differences be-
tween them, are often confused. The evolution of the ABA Code
demonstrates this. In 1908 the ABA adopted hortatory Canons of
Ethics.32 The relationship between the rule and goal aspects was
inherently unclear, and in 1969 the ABA Code divided the Canons
into aspirational statements, called Ethical Considerations, and
Disciplinary Rules. The Disciplinary Rules are mandatory; the
Ethical Considerations are voluntary,3 3 although some courts,
compounding the confusion, have interpreted them as
mandatory.3 4
The discussion draft and the proposed final draft of the Model
Rules propose to resolve this confusion by offering rules in "Re-
statement of Law" form. Since there will only be rules, there will
be no confusion or ambiguity with respect to what an attorney
ought to do and what he must do. Commentators have attacked
the format of the discussion draft as too new.3 5 Additionally, the
new format belittles the attorney by suggesting that appeals to his
better nature will be of no avail. Only having rules for guidance
suggests a criminal code. The drafts of the Model Rules imply that
an attorney who does not breach a specific rule is living up to his
complete professional obligation. The drafts also suggest that the
means of enforcement of the rules will be some form of imposed
sanction. They do not seem to expect the attorney's conscience to
guide him on the route to correct professional behavior.
In 1836, David Hoffman published, as part of a more general
course of study, fifty resolutions, and an accompanying short es-
say, on professional ethics for attorneys.36 This was the first Amer-
ican code of legal ethics. 37 This code defined the role of the
attorney as essentially that of an officer of the court. It attempted
32. See ABA CANONS OF PROFESSIONAL ETmcs (1908) [hereinafter cited as ABA
CANONS; V. COUNTRYMAN, T. FnMAN & T. SCHNEYER, THE LAWYER IN MODERN
SocIETY 934-46 (2d ed. 1976).
33. "The Ethical Considerations are aspirational in character .... " Preliminary
Statement to ABA CODE, s-upra note 1. '"The Disciplinary Rules, unlike the
Ethical Considerations, are mandatory in character." Id.
34. See Committee v. Behnke, 276 N.W.2d 838 (Iowa 1979), appeal dismissed, 444
U.S. 805 (1979).
35. See, e.g., Kettlewell, Keep the Format of the Code of Professional Responsibil-
ity, 67 A.B.A.J. 1628, 1632 (1981).
36. D. HOFFMAN, A COURSE OF LEGAL STUDY ADDRESSED TO STUDENTS AND THE
PROFESSION GENERALLY (2d ed. 1836).
37. T. MORGAN & R. ROTUNDA, PROFESSIONAL RESPONsIBILrY, PROBLEMS AND
MATERIALs 15 n.1 (2d ed. 1981).
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to persuade attorneys to be better by aspirational appeal. In sub-
stance, it is much closer in spirit to the discussion draft of the
Model Rules than to the ABA Code, the American Lawyer's Code
of Conduct, or the proposed final draft of the Model Rules. In form,
it is closer to the ABA Code than to the discussion draft and the
proposed final draft of the Model Rules.
This Commentary will examine certain features of Hoffman's
resolutions and his essay on professional deportment. Part II will
briefly discuss Hoffman and his Course; Part III will examine his
reliance on persuasion; Part IV will focus on his emphasis of the
attorney as an officer of the court; Part V will briefly conclude.
II. HOFFMAN AND HIS COURSE
David Hoffman was one of the leading American legal educa-
tors3 8 in ante-bellum America. 39 In 1816 he left a profitable law
practice to attempt an ambitious and single-handed reform of legal
education at the University of Maryland.40 After twenty-five years,
as a result of difficulties with the University's administration, he
resigned. 41 In 1836 he published A Course of Legal Study Ad-
dressed to Students and the Profession Generally.42 This was an
expanded version of a course he had published two decades earlier
at the University of Maryland.43
The principal purpose of the Course was to "produce a learned
and accomplished lawyer; and, perhaps ... to aid the researches
of the Counsellor, the Judge, and the Statesman."4 4 More particu-
larly, Hoffman was aware that unsystematic and unsupervised law
study was difficult. He published this outline "to reclaim the time
and labour thus often and unprofitably expended, by selecting
what was valuable in legal learning, and so arranging as best to
adopt it to the complete and ready comprehension of the stu-
dent."45 In all, the outline was 845 pages long. Hoffman estimated
that it would take at least seven years to finish it.46 Hoffman pru-
dently outlined shorter courses for "those who intend to reside in
38. F. Ax-tANN, THE CHANGING AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: SOME SELECTED
PHASES 89-91, 102-03 (1940); 2 A. CHROUsT, THE RISE OF THE LEGAL PROFESSION
IN AMERICA 203-06 (1965); P. MILLER, THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA 83.84 (1962).
39. This period refers to the decades before the Civil War.
40. 2 A. CHROUST, supra note 38, at 205-06.
41. P. MILLER, supra note 38, at 82.
42. D. HOFFMAN, supra note 36.
43. The first edition was published in 1817 but did not contain the Resolutions in
Regard to Professional Deportment. See Patterson, Legal Ethics and the
Lawyer's Duty of Loyalty, 29 EMORY L.T. 909, 913 (1980).
44. D. HOFFMA, supra note 36, at 43-44.
45. Id. at 29.
46. Id. at 826.
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either of the maritime cities,"47 for "those who desire to hasten to
the bar, after a careful study of about three years,"4 8 and for "those
alone who are to practice their profession in the country, that is
out of the maritime cities." 49
The Course was divided into thirteen titles: (1) Moral and Polit-
ical Philosophy; (2) Elementary and Constitutional Principles of
the Municipal Law of England, of the United States, and of the Ro-
man Civil Law; (3) The Law of Real Rights and Real Remedies;
(4) The Law of Personal Rights and Personal Remedies; (5) The
Law of Equity; (6) The Lex Mercatoria; (7) The Law of Crimes and
Punishment; (8) The Law of Nations; (9) Maritime and Admiralty
Law; (10) The Civil or Roman Law; (11) The Constitution and
Laws of the United States; (12) The Constitutions and Laws of the
Several States; and (13) Political Economy. The Course also in-
cluded nine divisions: (1) The Geography, and Civil, Statistical,
and Political History of the United States; (2) Forensic Eloquence
and Oratory; (3) Legal Biography and Bibliography; (4) Legal
Reviews, Essays, Journals, Magazines, etc.; (5) Codification and
Proposed Amendments of Law; (6) Medical Jurisprudence;
(7) Military and Naval Law; (8) Logic; and (9) Professional
Deportment.5 0
The format of each title or division was the same. Hoffman pro-
vided a list of readings, and he then appended notes, raising ques-
tions about the materials, pointing out areas of controversy, and in
a few instances, stating his own views.
Division IX related to Professional Deportment.5 1 In an intro-
ductory note, Hoffman asserted that the subject was "almost whol-
ly new,"5 2 and that "on the peculiar duties and conduct of the
lawyer, little that is very valuable, has been written."5 3 After list-
ing several books, the first four of which were the Proverbs of Solo-
mon and the Books of Ecclesiastes, Ecclesiasticus, and Wisdom,5 4
and after including several notes on the assigned reading, Hoffman
offered his own views on professional deportment in Note 18, "Ob-
servations on Professional Deportment, with some Rules for a
Lawyer's Conduct through Life."55 Hoffman believed this division
most important, and he insisted that it not be deleted from any of
47. Id. at 827.
48. Id. at 835.
49. Id. at 841.
50. Id. at 56-58.
51. Id. at 720.
52. Id. at 723.
53. Id. at 724.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 744-75.
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the shorter courses. 5 6
This Commentary focuses on Note 18. Its claims are that:
(1) Hoffman's views can be seen as a legitimate predecessor to the
substance of the discussion draft of the Model Rules and (2) Hoff-
man's views as to format have not been followed in the drafts of
the Model Rules. It makes no general historical claims. Although
there is some evidence that others in ante-bellum America, such as
David Dudley Field, believed as Hoffman did, it is not certain how
widespread their assumptions were.5 7 Moreover, it is uncertain if
practitioners acted the way Hoffman preached. It is probable that
they did not. This was a period of Jacksonian equalitarianism, and
the sense of elitism which permeated Hoffman's Course was ab-
sent in real life.58 The general trend was to permit anyone to be an
attorney. Roscoe Pound called this era a period of deprofessional-
ization.5 9 Hoffman's resolutions may in fact suggest what attor-
neys did not in fact do. Since there were no institutional
mechanisms to implement any code of ethics, Hoffman might have
believed that he had to persuade attorneys to act differently and as
he wished.
Ill. PERSUASION
To appreciate Hoffman's reliance on exhortation as a means to
control attorney behavior, it is important to note that he believed
that rules and appropriate sanctions could be effective tools of re-
form in other arenas of life. This is most evident when one exam-
ines his general attitude toward legislative or judicial rule-making.
His essay on codification in Division V of his Course reveals his
beliefs.6 0
Hoffman believed that codification, although not a panacea for
all problems, would be desirable reform. He wrote "that an ap-
proximation is better than no approach to perfection." 61 However,
he believed that this would only be true if codification were done
56. Id. at 834.
57. See P. MImLER, THE LIFE OF THE MNmD IN AMERICA 261-63 (1965); Schudson,
Public, Private and Professional Lives: The Correspondence of David Dudley
Field and Samuel Bowles, 21 AMER. J. LEGAL HIsT. 191 (1977).
58. 2 A. CHRoUST, supra note 38, at 171.
59. R. POUND, THE LAWYER FROM ANTIQUnTy TO MODERN TmEs 221-42 (1953).
60. D. HOFFmAN, supra note 36, at 672-88. The problem of codification beset the
ante-bellum legal mind. See M. BLooMmILD, AMERICAN LAWYERS IN A
CHANGING SocIETY 138 (1975); P. MILLER, supra note 57, at 119. Attitudes
ranged considerably. Some, informed by an extreme anti-English bias and a
fear of judicial law-making, believed that all laws must be legislative. M.
BLOOMFIELD, supra, at 84-85. Others, informed by a faith in the common law,
resisted all change. Id. at 85.
61. D. HOFFMAN, supra note 36, at 673.
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by the right persons. "Mere common lawyers" 62 or persons of
"mere local knowledge and prejudice" 63 could not do it; instead,
the work had to be "entrusted to scholars in the law."6 4 Although
Hoffman did not explicitly so state, he probably meant elite mem-
bers of the bar who had studied his reading list.
Codification was to result in three codes: a simplified, indexed,
and arranged code of statutes annotated with relevant judicial
opinions; a simplified, indexed, and "well expressed digest of
merely expository judicial law,"65 on the order of a restatement;
and a code of professional forms.
Hoffman's belief that codification would facilitate reform was
most evident, however, in his proposed temporary code of unascer-
tained law. He suggested that his "scholars in law" examine,
among other things, treatises, foreign laws, and customary usages
for desirable new laws. They would then "clothe [these potential
laws] ... in proper language" 66 and insert the language in the stat-
utory and judicial codes for consideration by the legislature or the
judiciary, respectively. Hoffman's proposed code was to be tempo-
rary because it would constantly be modified as the suggestions
were either accepted or rejected. In effect, what Hoffman recom-
mended was a modern law review commission.
Hoffman was also aware that law was constantly changing.
Since any codification would, by its very nature, require change, he
recommended that a Board of Censors, made up of scholars in law,
constantly review legislative and judicial developments, and annu-
ally recommend an updating of the respective codes. Moreover,
the Board of Censors would also annually produce "a digest of un-
ascertained law, or proposed law, for the consideration, adoption,
modification, or rejection"6 7 of the political institutions. Hoffman
viewed reform as an ongoing process.
With respect to the legal profession and the legal process, how-
ever, Hoffman relied on individual moral persuasion rather than on
rules to encourage good behavior. The use of resolutions, written
in the "I shall" format, demonstrated this attitude. Moreover, Hoff-
man continually reminded his students to be better persons. 68 Av-
arice, for example, was morally undesirable.69 He also emphasized
the potential for personal moral taint if his students should misuse
62. Id. at 679.
63. Id. at 685.
64. Id. at 686.
65. Id. at 675.
66. Id.
67. Id. at 682.
68. See D. MELLINKOFF, THE CONSCIENCE OF A LAWYER 171-73 (1973); P. MILLER,
supra note 38, at 84.
69. D. HoFFmAN, supra note 36, Resolution XLIX, at 774.
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their talents or become partners of their clients in immoral con-
duct. In Resolution XI he worried about "lending myself to a
dishonourable use of legal means"70 and in Resolution XII he as-
serted that "[the client] shall never make me a partner in his knav-
ery."7' Hoffman consistently tried to persuade his students to lead
a good moral life.
One reason, perhaps, that Hoffman ignored enforceable rules as
a means of causing change in the legal profession was that there
were no institutional mechanisms capable of implementing an eth-
ical code. This was a period of individualism and of deprofession-
alization,7 2 and there was no realistic hope of effective external
regulation of attorneys. There were no common institutions,
schools, or means of policing undesirable behavior. The necessary
bar cohesiveness of the late 18th century had passed, and it would
not return until a sense of professionalism, nurtured by law
schools and bar associations, developed in the late 19th century.73
Hoffman was sensitive to this lack of professional community and
tried to stimulate-it.
Many of his resolutions are devoted to this end. He reminded
his reader to "be always courteous ... [to his] professional breth-
ren,"74 not to "envy him the fruits of his toil or good fortune,"75 to
"ever be kind and encouraging... to [his] juniors,"76 and "[w] hen
age and infirmities have overtaken [his fellow attorneys], [his]
kindness [should] teach them the loveliness of foregiveness."77
Community was further encouraged by his belief that all attorneys
should avoid the "taking of half fees," 78 that is, the undercutting of
a fee established by "usage or law."79 Moreover, he asserted, no
attorney should take a cause in which another attorney had been
previously retained; this was to avoid client piracy.80 Concern for
70. Id., Resolution XI, at 754.
71. Id., Resolution XI, at 754.
72. See note 59 supra.
73. See L FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAw 525-66 (1973).
74. D. HOFFMAN, supra note 36, Resolution V, at 752.
75. Id., Resolution XXXVII, at 768.
76. Id, Resolution XVII, at 758.
77. Id., Resolution XXXVIII, at 768.
78. Id., Resolution XXVIII, at 763 (emphasis omitted).
79. Id.
80. Resolution VII provided:
vi. As a general rule, I will not allow myself to be engaged in a
cause to the exclusion of, or even in participation with the counsel
previously engaged, unless at his own special instance, in union with
his client's wishes: and it must, indeed, be a strong case of gross
neglect or of fatal inability in the counsel, that shall induce me to
take the cause to myself.
Id., Resolution VII, at 753. Except for extreme cases, Resolution VII gave the
first attorney a veto over whether the client could retain a second attorney.
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community was also reflected in Hoffman's several resolutions
with respect to an attorney's relationship with a judge. He opined
that "I will ever be respectful" to judges,81 and regardless of how
treated, "a firm and temperate remonstrance is all that I will allow
myself."82
Hoffman's reliance on persuasion as a means of regulating at-
torney conduct, however, was more than just a second-best form of
control, useful only because there were so few institutional mecha-
nisms capable of implementing rules. Hoffman also believed that
attorneys, more than most men, could be encouraged to better be-
havior. This is demonstrated by his not infrequent recasting of a
problem of legal rule or procedure into a defect of a particular at-
torney's character or personal morality. Hoffman consistently per-
ceived deportment problems where others might have seen faulty
institutions. Once seen in this way, Hoffman would exhort the of-
fending attorneys to better conduct.
For example, common law pleading was the normal civil proce-
dure in ante-bellum America. It came under considerable criti-
cism from reformers, and within a few decades many jurisdictions
replaced it with David Dudley Field's code pleading.83 In his note
on "Pleas & Pleading,"84 Hoffman asserted, however, that the sys-
tem was "wonderfully free from important or mischievious de-
fects;"8 5 it was admirably designed to "obtain an answer, from the
court or the jury, on a defined point in controversy."86 He did ad-
mit that certain "excrescences" 87 had been added to common law
pleading, and he believed that those ought to be removed. The
principal problem with common law pleading, however, was that it
could be '"perverted to very bad purposes"88 by unworthy practi-
tioners. In Hoffman's view, however, proper reform rested with
improving the deportment of practitioners rather than with any
structural change in the system. As Hoffman wrote:
It would be no difficult task to point out many abuses of this noble science,
and to suggest simple and adequate remedies; but as these abuses are
attributable, much more to the faults of those who cultivate it, than to in-
herent defects in the science itself, the subject would seem to belong quite
as much to the head of Professional deportment, as to that of the Philoso-
phy of Pleading.8 9
This rule was consistent with those cases which required court approval to
change attorneys in order to protect the rights of the first attorney. See
Mumford v. Murray, 1 Hopk. Ch. 369 (N.Y. 1825).
81. D. HoFFMAN, supra note 36, Resolution MI, at 752.
82. Id., Resolution IV, at 752.
83. L. FRIEDMAN, supra note 73, at 340-50.
84. D. HOFFMAN, supra note 36, at 348-57.
85. Id. at 349.
86. Id. at 351.
87. Id. at 352.
88. Id. at 350.
89. Id. at 355.
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Hoffman also revealed this tendency to perceive an issue in the
civil procedure arena not as one of bad law, but rather as one of
character defect, subject to his exhortations, in his discussion of
arbitration. Arbitration in the early 19th century had become a dis-
covery tool rather than a method of dispute resolution. Hoffman
reported that many attorneys tended to use arbitration not "to pre-
vent expensive and dilatory judicial litigation," 90 but "as the
means of procuring an inquiry, merely preliminary to ultimate pro-
ceedings in a court of justice."91 Hoffman did not perceive the
problem as one of defective law or process. The true problem was
misuse of the system by some dishonorable practitioners, and
Hoffman referred the problem to his discussion of deportment. In
his note, "Arbitrament and Award, Accord and Satisfaction,"92 he
wrote: "The avoidance of [this] gross abuse... , and the cultiva-
tion of those elevated morals, which would render it impracticable,
would be topics more proper for our head of Professional
Deportment ... 93
The drafts of the Model Rules rely on rules to control attorney
conduct. Any aspirational appeal is considered either confusing or
useless.94 Hoffman, both because the legal community of his time
did not have the institutions to enforce rules and because he be-
lieved attorneys, even those of ante-bellum America, would re-
spond favorably to proper professional goals, sought to persuade
attorneys to be better persons and better lawyers. Hoffman's
method of persuasion has been abandoned by the drafts of the
Model Rules.
IV. OFFICER OF THE COURT
The basic premise underlying the substance of the ABA Code,
the Kutak proposed final draft of the Model Rules, and the Ameri-
can Lawyer's Code of Conduct is that in most situations there will
not be a clear moral right and wrong. This fundamental moral am-
biguousness helps to justify the concept of the attorney as an advo-
cate, with his one-sided balance of duties. Hoffman did not accept
this assumption. Instead, Hoffman believed that in most cases one
party was clearly morally right. He wrote: "[I]n most cases one of
90. Id. at 359.
91. Id.
92. Id. at 358-60.
93. Id. at 359.
94. Introduction to MODEL RULEs (Proposed Final Draft), supra note 23.
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the disputants is knowingly in the wrong. . .. "95
Hoffman believed that it was extremely important for attorneys
to keep clear consciences and not to seek unjust goals or use un-
just means on behalf of clients. The principal threat to proper at-
torney conduct was the temptation an attorney might feel to be a
strong advocate for his client. Hoffman expressed this concern in
his Note 18 Essay in which he wrote:
But such an office brings its ministers into a too intimate and dangerous
acquaintance with man's depravity; it places them in the midst of tempta-
tions; and whilst engaged in rescuing others, they sometimes fall the only
lamented victims .... The success of the client is always that of the
counsel: the interests and feelings of the latter become in a measure iden-
tified with those of the former, and be they meritorious or the reverse, the
tie is often of such a nature as to generate the seeds of moral evil. Perhaps
in a majority of legal disputes some dereliction of sound morals lies on one
side or the other; not that cases do not arise in which the question is hon-
estly and justly disputed by both of the litigant parties. But believing, as
we do, that in most cases one of the disputants is knowingly in the wrong,
the lawyer's vocation must of necessity expose him to some portion of
those feelings, and agitating passions which either generate these causes,
or protract them to a long and vexatious period. In point of interest, also,
as well as of feeling, the lawyer is occasionally too intimately connected
with his client not to feel the force of those passions which lessen the ar-
dour of virtue.96
His resolutions clearly reflected this attitude. The first resolu-
tion set the negative tone. A lawyer ought not to let "professional
zeal... carry [him] beyond the limits of sobriety and decorum." 97
As has been noted, Hoffman cautioned his students against "lend-
ing [them] selves to a dishonourable use"98 or becoming "part-
ner[s] in [their clients'] knavery."99 Other resolutions further
95. D. HOFFMAN, supra note 36, at 746. See also Simon, The Ideology ofAdvocacy:
Procedural Justice & Professional Ethics, 1978 Wis. L REV. 29.
96. D. HoFFmAN, supra note 36, at 745-46 (emphasis in original). Hoffman further
wrote:
[The lawyer] is made familiar with the artful devices of cunning; the
ingenious contrivances of fraud and oppression; the well guarded
schemes of the shrewd, artfully made by them to amble on the very
confines of dishonesty, yet speciously to avoid an overt breach of
morals; and finally, he is compelled to learn the most dangerous of all
lessons, viz: the vast power, conferred by intellectual superiority,
over the rights and possessions of the ignorant, or the necessitous.
And though the lawyer's obligation to be faithful in the discharge of
the numerous trusts reposed in him, be of the most solemn and
honourable kind, yet the temptations to some indirection are so in-
sidious, so various, and so powerful, that he needs the constant pres-
ence of the best guarded, and most confirmed moral principles, to
counteract their almost insensible operation.
Id. at 746.
97. Id., Resolution I, at 752.
98. Id., Resolution XI, at 754.
99. Id., Resolution XII, at 754.
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suppqrt this tone. In Resolution XIV Hoffman wrote: "My client's
conscience, and my own, are distinct entities.., and... I shall
ever claim the privilege of solely judging to what extent to go."0
In Resolution XXXIII Hoffman stated:
What is morally wrong, cannot be professionally right, however it may be
sanctioned by time or custom .... If, therefore, there may be among my
brethren, any traditional moral errors of practice, they shall be studiously
avoided by me, though in so doing, I unhappily come in collision with what
is (erroneously I think) too often denominated the policy of the
profession.1 0 1
These attitudes-that an attorney could know what was just
and that he should do nothing to advance injustice-permeated all
of Hoffman's resolutions. They informed his resolutions with re-
spect to whether or not an attorney should accept a case. On the
whole, Hoffman was willing to rely on the market to distribute le-
gal services, but he was sensitive to the problem that there would
be a number of situations in which potential clients would not be
able to pay any fee, normal or contingent.102 In these cases, he
believed that each attorney had an obligation to provide legal serv-
ices to those who otherwise could not afford them. However, this
obligation was limited to only those clients who had 'just"
causes.103 Hoffman rejected a pro bono obligation which focused
exclusively on the means of the client. For Hoffman, if the cause
was not just, the attorney had no obligation to the indigent client.
This attitude with respect to not accepting a case to advance the
unjust ends of a client was even more apparent in the criminal law
area. Hoffman did not view a client's goal to be free as an accepta-
ble reason to represent a client if the attorney knew that the client
was in fact guilty of a major and serious crime. Hoffman cited Cic-
ero, with approval, that "an orator may defend the guilty, provided
his case be not wholly villanous and abominable."10 4 It is the pro-
viso which suggests Hoffman's true attitude-the devil was not en-
titled to an advocate.105
Once a client had been accepted, Hoffman certainly did not
place as much importance on the confidentiality of a client's com-
100. Id., Resolution XIV, at 755.
101. Id., Resolution XXXII, at 765.
102. Hoffman reluctantly endorsed the contingent fee arrangement. He recog-
nized that if this method were not used "the poor man... ,could neither
prosecute, nor be defended." Id, Resolution XXIV, at 761.
103. Id., Resolution XXIII, at 760.
104. Id. at 84 (emphasis added on "provided").
105. Hoffman's attitude was strikingly different from Dr. Johnson's. Johnson re-
sponded to Boswell's question, "But what do you think of supporting a cause
which you know to be bad?" with "Sir, you do not know it to be good or bad
till the Judge determines it." D. MELLNKOFF, supra note 68, at 164 (quoting
Dr. Samuel Johnson).
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munications as does the American Lawyer's Code of Conduct,
which makes the client communication the central, and most im-
portant, feature of the attorney-client relationship.106 Hoffman
never explicitly mentioned the duty to keep a confidence. He must
not have seen it as a fundamental duty. At most, it was only one
aspect of what constituted diligent representation.
However, Hoffman probably did accept an attorney-client privi-
lege as defined by the law of evidence. The evidence books which
Hoffman recommended enunciated the rule.'0 7 An attorney could
not be compelled to disclose certain communications. How exten-
sive a privilege Hoffman was comfortable with is uncertain. The
parameters of the rule were questionable, especially in America,
and there was even some resistance to its adoption as a rule of
evidence. 0 8
It is probable, however, that Hoffman would not have wished to
extend the rule of evidence beyond its narrow parameters. To do
so would have exaggerated the importance of maintaining client
confidences, and Hoffman's failure to refer to the problem indi-
cates that he did not give it much importance. This position is fur-
ther supported by an important statement in Hoffman's note on
Cicero's Offices.'0 9 Hoffman approved of much of what Cicero
wrote, for he said that there was little of "false morality" in it.110
Cicero believed that it was equally as bad to conceal as to affirma-
tively mislead."' Hoffman recounted that Cicero decried a
merchant who sold goods to a buyer who believed them scarce
when the merchant knew a large shipment was in transit and did
not tell the buyer; the merchant should have revealed his knowl-
edge."l2 Since Hoffman held individuals, including attorneys, ac-
countable as persons, he probably would have concluded that an
attorney had an obligation equivalent to the merchant. Hoffman
106. See note 19 & accompanying text supra.
107. See, e.g., 1 T. STARKIE, A PRACTICAL TREATISE ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE 103
(3d Am. ed. 1830).
108. Hazard, An Historical Perspective on the Attorney-Client Privilege, 66 CALI.
L. REV. 1061 (1978).
109. D. HoFFmA, supra note 36, at 81.
110. Id. at 83.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 83-84. Hoffman wrote:
The case put is where the merchant of that city had shipped to
Rhodes a quantity of grain, when that article was extremely scarce
and dear at that place, but great quantities had been shipped for Al-
exandria to Rhodes, and were then on the way; which fact, known to
him alone, he did not conceal, but merely did not disclose. The justi-
fication he says is a distinction without a difference, and to be re-
sorted to only by 'your shifting, sly, cunning, deceitful, roguish,
crafty, foxish, juggling kind of fellows.'
Id. (emphasis in original).
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therefore believed that an attorney would have to tell about the
shipment, regardless of how he got his information.
Hoffman's attitudes about an attorney's knowledge of the mor-
ally just and about what was proper conduct on behalf of a client
also inform the resolutions which focus specifically on the particu-
lar means an attorney might use as a civil and criminal litigator, a
negotiator, and a counselor." 3 In general litigation, he advised his
students not to advance a cause if the motives were "envy, hatred
or malice;"" 4 he had his students resolve not to use vexatious de-
fenses to press another into "an unjust compromise."nS Always
he was as concerned with the moral, as the legal, aspect of a case.
In Resolution XI, he wrote: "If, after duly examining a case, I am
persuaded that my client's claim or defence (as the case may be),
cannot, or rather ought not, to be sustained, I will promptly advise
him to abandon it."116 By using the phrase, "rather ought not to be
sustained," Hoffman implied that some causes could be, but ought
not to be, sustained. This is the distinction between law and mo-
rality. Even if one could predict that the courts would sustain the
claim, Hoffman asserted that the claim should not be raised if, as a
question of morality, it "ought not to be sustained."" 7
Further examples of Hoffman's recommendations in a litigation
113. Attorneys owed their clients the duty of competent representation, id., Reso-
lution XX, at 759, as well as representation without conflict. Id, Resolutions
V at 752-53, VII at 753, XIV at 755, XXI at 759, XXIII at 760, XXXV at 766. In
addition, Hoffman believed that both attorney and client ought to treat each
other justly. At several points in the resolutions, Hoffman charged his stu-
dents not to take advantage of their clients. For example, when the client
wanted to settle, a lawyer ought not. "keep up the ball (as the phrase goes) at
[his] client's expense, and to [his] own profit," id., Resolution XIX, at 758-59
(emphasis in original); neglect the small clients, id., Resolution XXIII, at 760;
retain or commingle a client's funds so that "it will be less liable to be consid-
ered as [the lawyer's]." Id., Resolution XXVI, at 762. Hoffman was equally
concerned that an attorney not allow his client to treat him unfairly. The
attorney, for example, was instructed to charge only a just fee. Once this was
assessed, however, there could be no compromise. Since it was a fair fee, to
permit a compromise would be to allow the client to treat the lawyer unjustly
by paying less than the fair fee. Id, Resolution XLIX, at 774. Hoffman's no-
client-piracy rule was also, in good part, designed to prevent the client from
unfairly treating the prior-retained lawyer. Id., Resolution VI, at 757.
114. Id., Resolution II, at 752.
115. Id., Resolution X, at 754.
116. Id., Resolution XI, at 754. Resolution XI further providech
To press it further in such a case, with the hope of gleaning some
advantage by an extorted compromise, would be lending myself to a
dishonourable use of legal means, in order to gain a portion of that,
the whole of which I have reason to believe would be denied to him
both by law and justice.
Id. (emphasis in original).
117. Id. Hoffman's position was strikingly different from Holmes' "Bad Man" the-
ory of law. Holmes wrote:
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situation were his resolutions on pleading either the statute of lim-
itations or incapacity because of infancy.1' 8 Hoffman knew that
these defenses could be raised legally, but he also recognized that
they were available for particular reasons, such as to encourage
creditors to bring timely suits before witnesses disappeared. To
use these defenses to promote their legitimate ends was permissi-
ble, but to use them for no other purpose than to win a case was, in
Hoffman's view, dishonorable. The client might want the defense
used and it might be available at law, but Hoffman insisted that no
attorney should use it.119 It would create an unjust result.120
There were also limited modes of persuasion properly available
to an attorney in litigation. Appeals to rationality and to justness
were all that Hoffman permitted. Resolution XLVII prescribed
that persuasion should only be done "through the medium of logi-
cal and just reasoning"' 2 1 and that attorneys should only "appeal
to the sympathies of our common nature as are worthy."'122 Hoff-
man particularly cautioned against using one's talents, even intel-
ligence, to advance unworthy goals. In Note 18, writing of the
attorney tempted to immorality, Hoffman concluded: "[H]e is
compelled to learn the most dangerous of all lessons, viz: the vast
power, conferred by intellectual superiority, over the rights and
possessions of the ignorant, or the necessitous."' 23
This moralistic attitude toward practice techniques was even
clearer in Hoffman's discussion of criminal defense work.124 His
The confusion with which I am dealing besets confessedly legal
conceptions. Take the fundamental question. What constitutes the
law? You will find some text writers telling you that it is something
different from what is decided by the courts of Massachusetts or
England, that it is a system of reason, that it is a deduction from prin-
ciples of ethics or admitted axioms or what not, which may or may
not coincide with the decisions. But if we take the view of our friend
the bad man we shall find that he does not care two straws for the
axioms or deductions, but that he does want to know what the Mas-
sachusets or English courts are likely to do in fact. I am much of his
mind. The prophecies of what the courts will do in fact, and nothing
more pretentious, are what I mean by the law.
Holmes, The Path of the Law, 10 HIv. L. REv. 457, 460-61 (1897).
118. D. HoFFum, supra note 36, Resolutions XII, XIII, at 754-55.
119. Id.
120. Id.
121. Id., Resolution XLVII, at 773.
122. Id.
123. Id. at 746.
124. Resolution XV provided:
xv. When employed to defend those charged with crimes of the
deepest dye, and the evidence against them, whether legal, or moral,
be such as to leave no just doubt of their guilt, I shall not hold myself
privileged, much less obliged, to use my endeavours to arrest, or to
impede the course of justice, by special resorts to ingenuity-to the
artifices of eloquence-to appeals to the morbid and fleeting sympa-
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first premise was that "foul offenders" deserved "merited penal-
ties."125 Hoffman would therefore not permit an attorney to use
certain techniques, such as "eminent talents [and] exalted learn-
ing" if "justice, and the substantial interests of the community"
would not be served.126 Hoffman believed that the more capable
the attorney, the greater the moral culpability for him to use his
talents to forestall merited punishment.
This insistence that technique not be used to advance unjust
results extended into the negotiations arena. For example, Hoff-
man insisted that an attorney not take advantage of another's igno-
rance. Hoffman strongly advised an attorney not to deal directly
with a nonlawyer antagonist, 27 and if it were absolutely necessary
to do so, to communicate only in writing.128 This was primarily to
protect the nonlawyer from his own ignorance. However, Hoffman
carried this a step further, for even if the attorney were dealing
with another attorney, he was cautioned that "no man's ignorance
or folly shall induce me to take any advantage of him."129
Furthermore, Hoffman added a most revealing resolution on ne-
gotiation itself. In Resolution XXXII he wrote:
thies of weak juries, or of temporizing courts--to my own personal
weight of character-nor finally, to any of the overweening influences
I may possess, from popular manners, eminent talents, exalted learn-
ing, &c. Persons of atrocious character, who have violated the laws of
God and man, are entitled to no such special exertions from any
member of our pure and honourable profession; and indeed, to no
intervention beyond securing to them a fair and dispassionate inves-
tigation of thefacts of their cause, and the due application of the law:
all that goes beyond this, either in manner or substance, is unprofes-
sional, and proceeds, either from a mistaken view of the relation of
client and counsel, or from some unworthy and selfish motive, which
sets a higher value on professional display and success, than on truth
and justice, and the substantial interests of the community. Such an
inordinate ambition, I shall ever regard as a most dangerous perver-
sion of talents, and a shameful abuse of an exalted station. The parri-
cide, the gratuitous murderer, or other perpetrator of like revolting
crimes, has surely no such claim on the commanding talents of a pro-
fession, whose object and pride should be the suppression of all vice,
by the vindication and enforcement of the laws. Those, therefore,
who wrest their proud knowledge from its legitimate purposes, to
pollute the streams of justice, and to screen such foul offenders from
merited penalties, should be regarded by all, (and certainly shall be
by me), as ministers at a holy altar, full of high pretension, and ap-
parent sanctity, but inwardly base, unworthy, and hypocritical-dan-
gerous in the precise ratio of their commanding talents, and exalted
learning.
Id. at 755-57 (emphasis in original).
125. See id.
126. See id.
127. Id., Resolution XLIII, at 771.
128. Id., Resolution XLIV, at 771.
129. Id., Resolution V, at 752.
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I will never permit myself to enter upon a system of tactics, to ascertain
who shall overreach the other, by the most nicely balanced artifices of dis-
ingenuousness, by mystery, silence, obscurity, suspicion, vigilance to the
letter, and all of the other machinery used by this class of tacticians, to the
vulgar surprise of clients, and the admiration of a few ill judging lawyers.
On the contrary,-my resolution in such a case is, to examine with great
care, previously to the interview, the matter of compromise; to form a
judgment as to what I will offer, or accept; and promptly, frankly, and
firmly to communicate my views to the adverse counsel In so doing, no
lights shall be withheld that may terminate the matter as speedily, and as
nearly in accordance with the rights of my client as possible; although a
more dilatory, exacting, and wary policy, might finally extract something
more than my own, or even my client's hopes. 1 3 0
The attorney was to make a judgment as to what he would settle
for. His decision was to be informed, inter alia, by his sense of
justice. It was not legitimate to extract more from an opponent
than what was deemed just merely because it was more. To
achieve this just settlement, Hoffman insisted that the negotiation
process be done in the most candid, straight-forward way possible.
Not only were many tactics specifically disapproved, such as the
clever use of silence, but the attorney was mandated "promptly,
frankly, and firmly to communicate [his] views to the adverse
counsel."131 Hoffman's negotiator's ethics were equivalent to his
litigator's ethics.
With respect to counseling, Hoffman wrote: "Counsel, in giving
opinions... , should act as judges .... "1 32 By using the phrase
"as judges," Hoffman suggested a role that went beyond the ABA
Code's concern with giving clients accurate predictions about what
might happen in the future.133 An accurate prediction could lead
to an unjust result, for in a particular case, future judges might be
130. Id., Resolution XXXII, at 764-65. Hoffman further cautioned. "Reputation
gained for this species of skill is sure to be followed by more than an
equivalent loss of character; shrewdness is too often allied to unfairness,--
caution to severity,--silence to disingenuousness-wariness to exaction, to
make me covet a reputation based on such qualities." Id.
131. Id., Resolution XXXII, at 765.
132. Id., Resolution XXXI, at 764 (emphasis omitted). Resolution XXXI provides
in fulh
xxxL All opinions for clients, verbal, or written, shall be my
opinions, deliberately and sincerely given, and never venal andflat-
tering offerings to their wishes, or their vanity. And though clients
sometimes have the folly to be better pleased with having their views
confirmed by an erroneous opinion, than their wishes or hopes
thwarted by a sound one, yet such assentation is dishonest and un-
professional. Counsel, in giving opinions, whether they perceive this
weakness in their clients or not, should act as judges, responsible to
God and to man, as also especially to their employers, to advise them
soberly, discreetly, and honestly, to the best of their ability-though
the certain consequence be the loss of large prospective gains.
Id. (emphasis in original).
133. ABA CODE, supra note 1, EC 7-5.
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informed by the letter of the law rather than its spirit. Hoffman
believed that when an attorney advised like a judge, he merged his
sense of moral ought-to-be into his legal opinion. This would result
in the attorney giving morally responsible advice.
V. SUMMARY
Is the attorney primarily an advocate or an officer of the court?
Commentators attacked the discussion draft of the Model Rules
for emphasizing the latter and for abandoning the adversarial sys-
tem.' 34 They claimed that the draft was revolutionary in departing
from traditional ways. This Commentary has suggested that there
has been no departure, for David Hoffman, in 1836, also believed
that an attorney was, more an officer of the court than an advocate.
Should proper attorney conduct be mandated by rules or
should ethics be essentially a matter of personal and professional
conscience? The drafts of the Model Rules answer that proper con-
duct can, and should, be guided only by rules. This is new, and a
departure from traditional methods. The 1908 ABA Canons and
the ABA Code do not rely on rules only. Hoffman's resolutions
were not legally enforceable duties.
This Commentary has offered an historical perspective on the
current legal ethics debate. It has shown that in spite of claims to
the contrary, the discussion draft of the Model Rules is traditional
in substance while both the discussion draft and the proposed final
draft are new in format. Such a showing, however, will not deter-
mine what is the best code or the best format for today. Proper
legal ethics change as social needs and assumptions change. The
legal profession is coming to grips with this fact.
134. See notes 17-20 & accompanying text mupra.
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